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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent Ray M. Harding initiated this action se~king 
an order prohibiting enforcement of a municipal ordinance by 
Appellant, Alpine City. Said ordinance provides for mandatory 
connection to the City sewer system for inhabited property within 
five hundred (500) feet of an existing sewer line. Respondent 
also is seeking an order of the Court determining that the 
Appellant may not assess Respondent a sewer connection fee of 
$1,464.00. Appeliant filed an Answer alleging that it has 
authority to enact and enforce said ordinance. Appellant, as 
an affirmative defense, alleged that Respondent failed to comply 
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Appellant also filed a 
counterclaim seeking an order requiring Respondent to connect 
to the sewer system and to pay the applicable connection fee. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered Summary Judgment in favor 
of Respondent on the 30th day of September, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully seeks a reversal of the Sununary 
Judgment entered by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court should 
direct entry of judgment in favor of Appellant, or in the 
alternative, order the District Court to proceed to conduct a 
trial in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Alpine City sewer connection ordinance provides 
for mandatory connection to the City sewer system of all 
inhabited buildings on property within five hundred (500) feet 
of an existing city sewer line. Respondent's residence is 
situated upon Respondent's property lying approximately three 
hundred sixty-five (365) feet from an existing city sewer line. 
Appellant has assessed Respondent the applicable sewer connec-
tion fee of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) of 
which One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars ($1,464.00) 
remains due and owing the City. 
Respondent filed a Complaint alleging that Appellant 
was without authority to require mandatory connection to the 
City sewer system for any building located on property located 
more than three hundred (300) feet from an existing City sewer 
line. 
Appellant counterclaimed for an order requiring 
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Appellant established the five hundred (500) foot 
mandatory connection requirement upon the advice of its City 
~ngineer. 
The Trial Court took no evidence with respect to the 
reasonableness of the mandatory connection requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THE INSTANT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
... the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The Summary Judgment should not be affirmed because 
significant issues of material fact exist and Respondent is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Respondent, in making 
a Motion for.Summary Judgment, has ignored these essential 
principles of summary judgment analysis under Utah law. 
First, upon motion for sununary judgment, the trial 
court is required to consider all relevant facts and their 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is made. The Utah Supreme Court noted 
in Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 
P.2d 807 (1966) as follows: 
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure, 
and for this reason plaintiff's contentions must be 
considered in a light most to his advantage and all 
-3-
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doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go.to 
trial; and only if when the whole matter is so viewed 
he could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery 
should the motion be granted. 
Id., 413 P.2d at 809. For other numerous references made by the 
Court to this proposition, see Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d·l250 
(Utah 1979); Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 565 P.2d 117 (Utah 1977); Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 
432 P.2d 60 (1967). 
Second, if the facts and their reasonable inferences 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party 
are in dispute, sununary judgment is simply improper. In 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure 
to judge the credibility of the averments of the partie 
or witnesses or the weight of the evidence. Neither is 
it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any 
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. 
Id., at 193. See also Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 386, 510 
P.2d 523 (1973); University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 
Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29 (1972); Transamerica Title Insurance Co. 
v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970); 
and Robinson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 22 Utah 2d 
163, 450 P.2d 91 (1969). 
Third, because an improperly granted summary judgment 
represents an extremely high cost in terms of time and resources 
to both the litigants and the courts of this state, sununary 
judgment should not be granted in any but the most clear-cut 
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cases. To this effect is the court's holding in Durham v. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (1977): 
The summary judgment procedure has the desirable and 
salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and 
expense of a trial when there are no issues of fact 
in dispute and the controversy can be resolved as a 
matter of law. Nevertheless, that should not be 
done on conjecture, but only when the matter is clear; 
and in case of do'ubt, the doubt should be resolved 
and allowing the challenged party the opportunity of 
at least attempting to prove his right of recovery. 
Id., at 1334. Appellant maintains that there are substantial 
and material issues of fact in dispute, and that the controversy 
therefore cannot be resolved against Appellant by Summary Judgmer 
as a matter of law. 
The Trial Court should have received evidence upon the 
reasonableness of the mandatory connection requirement. Such 
factors as protection of precious water sources from disease 
and contamination; density of existing and proposed housing; 
soil type and suitability for septic tanks and other relevant 
factors should have been considered. 
POINT II 
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ALPINE CITY SEWER CONNECTION 
ORDINANCE WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE GENERAL POLICE POWERS OF 
ALPINE CITY. 
Prior to the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of State v. Hutchinson, No. 16087, Utah had followed 
the so-called Dillon rule first enunciated in Merriam v. 
Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163 (1868). Essentially, the Dillon 
rule provided that local units of government had no powers or 
authority to act unless such action was taken pursuant to a 
specific grant of authority by the State Legislature. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding f r digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In Hutchinson, supra, the defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of a county ordinance which required the 
filing of campaign statements and.the disclosure of campaign 
contributions. The defendant challenged the ordinance on the 
basis that absent a specific grant of authority from the 
legislature, the county was powerless to enact this type of 
ordinance. The issue in the case was whether or not the 
general welfare grant found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
17-5-77, 1953 as amended, by itself provided a county with legal 
authority to enact this type of ordinance or whether there must 
be a specific grant of authority for counties to enact such 
measures. The Utah Supreme Court held that the rule requiring 
strict construction of powers delegated by the legislature to 
counties and municipalities is a rule which is archaeic, 
unrealistic and unresponsive to the current needs of both state 
and local government~ and effectively nulifies the legislature's 
grant of general police power to the counties. 
The campaign ordinances were held to be permissable 
under the general welfare provision above cited, as an indepen-
dent source of power to act for the general welfare of county 
citizens. The opinion significantly broadened the authority of 
local governments to enact ordinances unique to local govern~~· 
As the Supreme Court stated: 
When the state has granted general welfare to local 
governments, these governments are independent 
authority apart from and in addition to specific 
grants of authority to pass ordinances which are 
reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives 
o~ that powe7 . . . . and ~he courts will not interfere 
with the legislative choice of the means selected 
unless it is arbitrary, or is directly prohibited by 
-6-
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or is inconsistent with the policy of, the state or 
federal laws or the constitution of this state or of 
the United States. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-77, 
1953 as amended, relating to a general grant of powers to county 
commissioners, are virtually identical to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, 1953 as amended, which is a 
general grant of authority to municipalities in the State of 
Utah., 
Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
was cited by the Utah State Supreme Court in the case of John Cal 
and Clark Jenkins v. City of West Jordan, No. 15908, filed 
December 26, 1979, a case involving a suit by several subdividers 
against the City of West Jordan challenging imposition of a so-
called impact fee. The court, in determining that the city, in 
fact, had authority to impose that type of fee, even though 
there exists no state statute specifically granting cities that 
authority, cited with approval, Section 10-8-84, UCA. 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition Revised, 
Volume 11, Section 31-10, states as follows: 
The establishment and maintenance of a sewer system 
by a municipality is usually regarded as an exercise 
of its police power and so is an ordinance requiring 
property owners to make connections therewith. All 
persons hold their property subject to the law pro-
viding for the public health and general welfare and 
when sewers are necessary for the preservation of 
the public health, property must bear its just 
proportion of the cost of the construction and 
maintenance of them. 
McQuillin, in Section 31-30 also states: 
Power to regulate and control sewers and drains carrieE 
with it as a necessary incident authority to compel, 
regulate and control all dispensible, desirable or 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
convenient connections subject, of course, to.the 
observance of private property rights, accord~ngl¥, 
express power to 'construct, establish and maintain 
drains and sewers' includes power to make reasonable 
regulations for tapping and connecting with the 
sewers. Municipalities are generally authorized to 
compel property owners to make connection with the 
sewer within a reasonable distance when the public 
health requires it, and to pay the cost and expenses 
involved, all of which may be provided for by statute 
or ordinance, in the exercise of the police power. 
Section 10-8-38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
does provide that any city or town may, for the purpose of 
defraying the construction, reconstruction, maintenance, or 
operation of any sewer system or sewer treatment plant, provide 
for mandatory hookup where the sewer is available and within 
300 feet of any property line with any building used for human 
occupancy and make a reasonable charge for the use thereof. 
Said section certainly does not prohibit municipalities from 
requiring owners of property situated within 500 feet of any 
property line to connect to the municipal sewer system. Apply-
ing the Hutchinson decision, it would certainly be within the 
Respondent's power to require such property owners to connect 
to the City sewer system where such requirements are reasonable, 
uniform and arbitrary in application. The provisions of 
Section 10-8-38, UCA, 1953 as amended, is a grant of authority 
but is ·not a specific limitation upon the exercise of authority 
by municipalities. 
In the case of Rupp v. Grantsville (Utah 1980) 610 
p.2d 338, this Court upheld the mandatory sewer connection 
ordinance of the municipality of Grantsville. The opinion 
contains the following language: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In Utah, municipalities are granted broad powers for 
the protection of the health and welfare of their 
residents. Among these powers is the statutory 
authority to establish and maintain public utilities 
for the benefit of those residents. Inherent in the 
power to preserve and protect the health and welfare 
of municipal residents is the authority to adopt 
ordinances directed at the effectuation of that 
protection. This general grant of police power is 
codified in 70-8-84 which provides: 
''Illey [municipalities] may pass all ordinances and 
rules and make all regulations not repugnant to 
law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging all powers and duties conferred by 
this chapter, and such as are necessary and proper 
to provide for the safety and preserve the health 
and promote the prosperity . . . comfort and 
convenience of the city and inhabitants thereof, 
and for the protection of property herein; . . . ' 
The scope of police power conferred on municipal govern 
ments by the requirements incident to effective protec-
tion of the health and welfare of their citizenry are 
reflected in statutes such as 70-8-84. The relationshi 
between a mandatory connection ordinance and this polic 
power was recognized in Bigler v. Greenwood. In Bigler 
this Court in upholding the mandatory connection 
ordinance explained: 
'Such an ordinance is undeniably proposed to 
protect the health and welfare and is therefor a 
valid exercise of authority expressly conferred 
under the police power.' 
There is .nothing in the present situation which require 
a retreat from that position. The Grantsville ordinanc 
in question is a valid exercise of the municipalities 
recognized police power and therefore is enforceable 
against the plaintiffs. 
It is clear that under the rationale of Hutchinson, 
Call, and Rupp, supra, that Appellant has the authority to 
enact and enforce a reasonable mandatory sewer connection 
ordinance. The Trial Court erred in granting Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and in failing to receive evidence 
with respect to the reasonableness of the ordinance. 
Respondent argues that the Utah State Legislature has 
_o_ 
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pre-empted the area of mandatory connection to a sewer by pass-
age of UCA 10-8-38, 1953 as amended. Said statute provides, 
in part, that a city " ... may ... provide for mandatory 
hookup where the sewer is available and within 300 feet of any 
property line with any building." (Underlining added.) Appel-
lant contends that said statute does not purport to limit a 
municipality from increasing the distance requirement. Munici-
pal~ties must of necessity be allowed to exercise municipal 
powers in a flexible and effective manner to appropriately deal 
with varying circumstances. Appellant must have the inherent 
power to determine a reasonable distance for mandatory connection 
to the city sewer system and to take into account protection of 
vital water sources, prevention of disease, and other relevant 
factors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 1982. 
J HN C. BACKLUND 
ttorney for Appellant 
50 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
375-9801 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to Ray M. Harding, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 306 West 
Mai;;i~§treet, American Fork, Utah 84003, postage prepaid, this 
';/'~day of January, 1982. 
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